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MEDIATION—ITS POTENTIAL AND ITS
LIMITS: DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE
DISCOURSE ON THE RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE OF PEACEMAKING
Dennis C. Jett*
The articles in this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law &
International Affairs summarize analytic research relevant to conflict
situations and offer recommendations for how conflicts can more
effectively be brought to an end. It is therefore worth considering
how policymakers might employ these recommendations as they
pursue the often elusive goal of peace.
THE “POLICYMAKER” DEFINED
One difficulty with that task is that “policymaker” is a title
that can be applied to many different people playing many different
roles in a conflict situation. The policymakers within a national
government will be comprised of politicians elected to office, officials
appointed by those politicians, and career bureaucrats. Each of them
will approach the problem with different perspectives and priorities
though they are nominally on the same team.

* Dennis C. Jett, Professor of International Affairs, School of
International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University.
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Policymakers can come from the governments that are party
to the conflict, neighboring states, regional and global powers, and
any other nation that believes it has a dog in a particular fight.
In a civil war, in addition to the policymakers of the regime in
power, there are those who have some degree of control over the
group or groups trying to overthrow that regime in order to take
power themselves. In any country in conflict, there are also the
noncombatants who make up the elements of civil society that are
trying to bring it to an end. They may not make policy, but the
decisions they do make can place pressure on the combatants and
help the cause of peace.
And then there are international organizations, where the
representatives of member states provide instructions to international
civil servants on how those organizations are to be involved. Even
with clear guidance, there is much policy to be made in implementing
a mandate including how to interpret it in the field and how
forcefully to pursue it. Whether any of that can be done competently
with the resources made available to these organizations by their
members is another question.
That does not exhaust the list of players of course.
Nongovernmental organizations are often instrumental in peace
accords, once they are reached, as they can have the capacity to
implement programs that bring into being many of the elements of
such accords.
When the official representatives of the governments and
rebel groups that are parties to the conflict fail to end it, a potential
role for a mediator is created. Representatives of many of the
organizations can attempt to serve in that capacity along with
virtually anyone else who wants to engage in what is known as Track
II diplomacy.1 The only real requirement is that the parties to the
conflict accept them as mediators. There is usually no shortage of
elder statesmen and retired politicians willing to serve as mediators,
A discussion of Track II diplomacy and its use in the case of U.S.Iranian relations can be found at: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/track-iidiplomacy.
1
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especially if visions of a Nobel Peace Prize nomination are dancing in
their heads.
Even though all will agree that peace is the goal, each
policymaker will approach it from his or her perspective and be
encumbered by some limitations, which affect just how much policy
they are willing and able to make. With so many potential players, and
so many violent conflicts, it is therefore important to consider to
whom the policy recommendations are being made and what
constraints they may be operating under. It is with that preliminary
consideration in mind that I offer an evaluation as to whether the
recommendations contained in this journal issue are realistic and
useful.
MEDIATION RESEARCH IN PRACTICE
A. Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to
Fail but Actually Succeeds2
Improving mediation is important, but even the best
mediation is not a silver bullet solution. Wars can end in one of four
ways—through a military victory, when a halt to the fighting is
imposed by outside powers, when the parties to the conflict negotiate
a cessation of hostilities in good faith, and when they negotiate one in
bad faith.
When one side wins outright, there is no need for mediation.
A clear military victory is difficult in a civil war, however, as it usually
pits a government with a weak army against rebel forces that are even
weaker. Both sides will have the power to terrorize civilians, but
rarely enough to defeat each other.
When the international community steps in and forces an end
to the conflict, it does not remove the underlying reasons for why the
war started in the first place. That can imply a long-term commitment
to creating a solution and that, plus a general reluctance to use force

Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail
but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 27 (2013).
2
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to end the use of force, means there is rarely any enthusiasm for that
outcome among other countries.
A negotiated end to conflict can often involve and be
facilitated by mediation. But as Scott Sigmund Gartner points out in
his article, success is not as elusive as it seems because the conflicts in
which mediators are involved are also the ones least likely to succeed.
If a peace accord were easy, the parties could reach it themselves.
This point is worth remembering, and the international community
and potential mediators should not avoid making the effort simply
because the chances for success are not good. While mediation can
be costly in many ways, they pale in comparison to the likely costs of
continued war. The parties to the conflict will measure the cost of
mediation as the potential it has for diminishing their chances to
obtain more power, often without much regard for the toll on
noncombatants should the war continue. Human suffering aside, the
costs of relief efforts for refugees and people displaced by the
fighting can easily and quickly amount to hundreds of millions of
dollars.
The need for local expertise is one of the reasons that
regional governmental organizations, with close ties, in-depth
knowledge, and shared regional identities, are becoming increasingly
utilized as mediators.3 On the other hand, while the countries in the
region are the ones most directly affected by the spillover when a
conflict’s impact starts to cross borders, they may not be the best
choice.
Regional organizations are often given the task of dealing
with a conflict because the wider international community wants to
avoid getting further involved rather than because they make ideal
mediators. There is a strong correlation between conflict and poverty;
civil wars occur more frequently in the least developed countries. The
neighbors of countries in conflict are also likely to be poor and
therefore the least able to support the cost of mediation and
intervention. The neighboring states may also profit from the chaos
by exploiting the resources of the country at war. And they will likely
have an opinion as to which side they would like to see win. This may
3

Id.
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be due to ethnic linkages, which can serve to make the conflict more
difficult to resolve. So the decision to rely on a regional organization
should be considered carefully and not assumed to be the best
outcome.
B. Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator
Leverage and Conflict Resolution4
Kyle Beardsley’s discussion of the use of leverage by
mediators in attempting to end conflicts is a useful reminder that
mediators can try to use too much leverage as well as too little
leverage. Using too little will not resolve the conflict and using too
much might only result in a short-term cessation of hostilities and not
address the root causes of the conflict.
By using just the right amount of leverage, the mediator can
in theory achieve an end to the bloodshed and the humanitarian
disaster it has caused and, at the same time, set the stage for a lasting
peace. That is easier said than done, however, and it seems to
assume mediators have a range of tools to use and the ability and
willingness to use them. That is rarely the case.
Mediators are almost always in an inherently weak position.5
Their role has to be accepted by the parties to the conflict and those
parties do not see such efforts as an opportunity to negotiate their
own demise. They will limit what the mediator can accomplish and
choose a mediator precisely because that person is weak. They are
generally unwilling to concede much power to the mediator and will
resist any efforts to force them to do things that they calculate are
not in their interests. Thus, it is hard to identify too much or too little
leverage ex ante facto, before its use, although the appropriate degree
of leverage might be more clear ex post facto, after the mediation.
A mediator can have significant leverage if there is a
willingness on the part of the international community to use military
force or economic pressure to end a particular conflict. In his choice
Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013).
5 See generally id.
4
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of examples, Beardsley mentions the recent case of Syria where, as he
notes, Russia and China have blocked any U.N. Security Council
resolutions that might have teeth. Given the absence of any real
leverage, Kofi Annan’s efforts at mediation were doomed from the
start. Since the Assad regime was not about to negotiate its own
removal from power and is indifferent to the number of civilians
killed, the only tool in Annan’s toolbox was his ability to persuade
both sides to stop fighting, and that obviously proved insufficient.
Beardsley uses the case of Rwanda as one where mediators
used too much leverage He believes this only resulted in a short-term
cessation of hostilities, which was then followed by genocide after
they resumed. A lower level of leverage implies less international
involvement. It seems unlikely that would have made the outcome
better and resulted in fewer deaths. In retrospect, most have
concluded that a much more forceful intervention by the
international community was required instead of an attempt at
mediation that was too weak to prevent mass murder.
The problem for any mediator, and the international
community as a whole, is that it is never clear whether hostilities are
going to get worse or better. Even when there is some indication
which direction the conflict is headed, unforeseen events—like the
shooting down of the plane carrying Rwandan President
Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart—can be a catalyst for
catastrophe. Habyarimana, had he lived, might have successfully
implemented the Arusha accords.
The international reaction to conflict situations is often based
on hope and the desire to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The
biggest problem in Rwanda, as Beardsley points out, was the
international community followed up the signing of the peace
accords with a tiny peacekeeping force and a weak mandate that only
allowed them to become bystanders, and at times victims, when the
violence resumed.
The role of Richard Holbrooke in ending the war in Bosnia is
cited by Beardsley as a compelling case in which the use of leverage
calmed a humanitarian disaster. Holbrooke had a very forceful
personality, however, and the military might of NATO to draw upon
108
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if he chose to use it. There is no greater source of leverage than the
ability to use force to punish an uncooperative party.
Having that power at the ready is not going to typically be the
case. The international community is rarely willing to use such force.
The fighting in Libya ended because the international community was
willing to use such force in that instance. The fighting in Syria
continues, however, because the international community is not
willing to use force, at least not as of the time this is being written.
Another problem is that some mediators are life-long U.N.
bureaucrats. One of the unwritten rules for a successful career at the
U.N. seems to be “never alienate anyone.” With 193 member states
as their bosses, those that work at the U.N. do not like to stick their
necks out. A U.N. mediator therefore may not be enthusiastic about
using leverage since it is bound to displease someone. Even
mediators who are not U.N. officials are unlikely to have as strong a
personality type as Holbrooke.
Beardsley’s fundamental point, however, is important for any
mediator to consider. It is always essential to look into the toolbox
and see what instruments of leverage it contains. Unfortunately, in
many real world instances, there may not be much in the toolbox and
the mediator may not be able or willing to use the tools available.
Given Beardsley’s argument, additional research might examine how
to expand the options available to mediators.
C. Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate6
In her essay on when states mediate, Molly Melin concludes
that states should offer to mediate “only in optimal circumstances”
and policymakers should “first consider the characteristics of the
third party, the conflict, and the disputants.” Both recommendations
may seem obvious but are they easily achieved?
States seek to act as mediators when their interests are at
stake or when they feel they have to become involved. A
6

Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 78

(2013).
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humanitarian crisis can create pressure for international action as it
did for Bosnia and Darfur even when the national interests of the
major powers are not directly threatened. If the suffering largely
escapes the media’s attention and the public’s concern, as it has in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the pressure and the resulting
action will be much less however.
Another reason states want to mediate is prestige. When a
conflict is somehow identified with a potential mediator, because of
colonial ties or other linkages, there will again be pressure, often from
the public and the media, to play such a role. Having an interest in a
conflict implies the mediator is not indifferent to the outcome,
however, and that can lessen the acceptability of the mediator to the
parties to the dispute. As Melin points out, in cases where the
decision to attempt to mediate stems from domestic politics, public
pressure, national interests, or politicians’ search for prestige, the
decision to get involved may have little to do with whether the
situation is optimal for mediation.
If the conditions are not optimal, but the pressure to do
something to end the conflict is significant, states will often look for
non-state actors like international organizations or prominent former
statesmen willing to play the role. That way any blame for failure,
when it comes, can be shifted to the mediator and the damage to
national pride and political risk can be minimized.
As Melin points out, nation states are the most frequent
mediators of international disputes. Thus it is critical to understand
the factors affecting their involvement. As she suggests, it is the
parties involved in a conflict that decide whether there is to be a
mediator and they will do that only when they think it serves their
interests. The problem is that the disputants may not reach the stage
until what I. William Zartman has characterized as a “hurting
stalemate”7 has been achieved. The combatants will then see further
military efforts as impossible or unproductive. Arriving at that point
may take years and is why there are more conflicts every year than

See I. William Zartman, Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and Change,
518 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 11, 16 (1991).
7
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there are mediation efforts and not because states considering
becoming mediators are pondering their strategic choices.
D. Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and
Adjudication8
Wars come in two flavors—the international kind where the
opposing sides are nation states (interstate conflicts), and internal
ones, where the regime in power is pitted against those who seek to
overthrow it (intrastate conflicts). Wars between countries are usually
over territory, though there are usually other factors involved as well.
Wars within countries are almost always about political power. In the
former, if the parties are willing to accept the outcome, those
imaginary lines on maps called borders can easily be drawn to divide
territory. Resolving the latter type of conflict is harder, however,
because political power is not as easily divided, especially in a poor
country where elites are either in power or out of luck. When a
faction does take control of the government, even through legitimate
elections, the majority tends to rule with little regard for the rights of
minorities. And there is no Heritage Foundation or American
Enterprise Institute where ideologues can hang out until their side
can return to power.
The difference between interstate wars over territory and
intrastate wars over political power also has implications for
alternatives to mediation. As Gent points out in his essay,
international arbitration and adjudication is often the most effective
means of producing long-lasting settlements and certainly should be
considered as an alternative means of dispute resolution.
Such a binding mechanism, however, is unlikely to be used
when the challenge is dividing political power in a country where that
has never been achieved before. Dividing territory is something
international arbitrators are good at because there is usually some
legal basis on which to proceed, but it does not always end the
problem. Having an international body mandate a solution provides
cover to political elites who have to defend against charges that they
Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 66 (2013).
8
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have given up too much. Even that may not be enough to ease the
pain of wounded national pride, as Gent demonstrates in his
description of how Ethiopia rejected an international boundary
commission’s demarcation of its frontier with Eritrea.
Gent also points out that the losing side in the finding of an
arbitration panel is more likely to reject the decision if it possesses a
clear power advantage. That means either other, more flexible
mechanisms should be considered as he suggests, or at a minimum,
the international community needs to throw its weight behind
supporting the outcome and provide incentives for both sides to
respect it. One advantage of having elections as part of the process
that brings a civil war to end is that it confers legitimacy on the
winner. The loser will have an easy excuse for rejecting the result if
the winner is chosen by an international arbitrator and not by the
voters. To avoid that tendency, the international community must use
the carrots and sticks at its disposal to ensure the outcome is
accepted if the parties agree to arbitration.
Interestingly, international arbitration has increasingly
become the rule in international commercial disputes. While its use is
growing in non-commercial international disputes, it is still not
common. So while policymakers should certainly look carefully at all
aspects of the conflict—including who should mediate and when—
decisions are often made not on the basis of an objective and
detached assessment of what can be achieved. Rather decisions are
made on the basis of what is necessary and what is possible given the
political pressures they are operating under.
In order for
international arbitration to expand from economic to political
disputes actors will have to address these types of political pressures.
E. Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications9
Isak Svensson discusses the policy implications of bias in
mediators and concludes that even biased ones can play a useful role.
He notes that rebel-biased mediators tend to create peace settlements
that include power-sharing arrangements while government-biased
Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 PENN ST.
J.L. & INT’L AFF. 17 (2013).
9
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mediators opt for amnesties. Both the mediators and the outcomes
that are deemed acceptable are up to the parties in the conflict. The
bias in play may therefore result from the selection process rather
than a preference toward a particular solution on the part of the
mediator. Mediators “create” only those solutions that the
combatants will agree to and are able to consider solutions that might
be accepted by both sides.
Svensson’s central premise—that bias is not an inherent
disqualifying feature of mediation—is an important one. However,
and as Svensson points out, a little bias may not be a bad thing. The
real test is whether the mediator is capable of guiding the parties to
an agreement and not whether he or she is absolutely neutral. This
also represents a major distinction between domestic mediation—
which seeks neutrality among mediators—and international
mediation. For example, it not only took Begin and Sadat to create
peace between Israel and Egypt but it also took Carter, the leader of a
pro-Israel state, to convince Israel to give up territory in exchange for
a U.S. assurance of security. Mediators will often be charged with
bias, especially by the side playing the weaker hand, whether it exists
or not. The parties to the conflict have to have some sense that the
mediator will act fairly even if not necessarily impartially. The bias
may even help get the stronger side to a deal as it probably did at
Camp David.
F. Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking10
Birger Heldt, of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, examines the
growth in the number of efforts at peacemaking in emerging conflicts
and in particular the lack of coordination that results from so many
different actors becoming involved. To address this problem, he
suggests policymakers adopt a long-term strategy focused on
coordination. In addition, he urges policymakers not to be
discouraged by the failures of initial peacemaking attempts. He
cautions that the need for coordination should not crowd out
attempts at further peacemaking. He also emphasizes that if violence

Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking, 2 PENN
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 9 (2013).
10
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is going to escalate dramatically, it normally does so in the first two
years of the conflict.
That two-year window when effective peacemaking has a
chance to prevent a significant expansion of hostilities is critical for
policymakers to acknowledge and incorporate into planning efforts.
The problem, of course, is that senior officials in any busy capitol or
international body are almost always consumed by the crisis of the
moment and long-term planning rarely gets beyond next week. The
paradox and the tragedy is that until the violence does escalate, the
conflict is likely to fail to grab the attention of the media and the
policymakers.
The International Crisis Group and other organizations have
long tried to direct the attention of officials to crises in need of
attention and alert policymakers before the conflicts escalate. The
U.N. has discussed ways to improve crisis management and to take
advantage of constantly evolving information and communications
technology.11 It would be useful if each government and international
organization had an internal group that was designed to prioritize
mediation needs. And those groups should try and stay ahead of the
curve by engaging in a continuing dialogue with those who make the
study of mediation efforts their academic specialty.
The coordination of peacemaking efforts is made difficult by
the fact that there are no barriers to entry, especially to potential
Track II mediators. That may account for the growth in such efforts
as much as any other factor. It is still worthwhile to attempt to bring
coordination, as well as long-term planning, to peacemaking. The
biggest obstacle is perhaps a lack of time and attention to the
problem by policymakers as much as anything else. Heldt’s policy
recommendations offer an important reminder of the value of
preventative measures and of the critical timeframe for such action.

See generally Daniel Stauffacher, Strengthening Crisis Information
Management, 48 UN CHRONICLE (2011), http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/
chronicle/home/archive/issues2011/thedigitaldividend/strengtheningcrisisinforma
tionmanagement.
11
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G. Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An
Organizational Perspective12
Victor Asal and Jonathan Wilkenfeld provide a convincing
argument that assumptions about a conflict always need to be
checked and that generalizations expounded by scholars and
journalists can lead to the wrong policy choices. True experts in a
region need to convey the complexity of each situation to
policymakers without making it seem so difficult that any
involvement is unwise. Academics and other analysts need to keep in
mind that no data set can substitute for in-depth knowledge when it
comes to a particular conflict. Some humility is required in making
assessments of conflicts and policy recommendations regarding
them. If they are made simply on the basis of number crunching of
past conflicts, ideology or a lack of knowledge about the motivations
of the combatants, an illusion of understanding will be created and
could lead to poor decisions.13
H. David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and
Peace Processes in Civil War14
David Cunningham cautions that too many players can spoil
the peace process and urges that those without a veto be excluded
from it. It will not be only the mediator that decides who gets a seat
at the table, but to the extent that this recommendation can be
followed, it should be. While civil society may not participate in the
actual negotiations, it would also be useful to think of ways to help
them pressure the parties to come to an agreement. Leymah Gbowee,
the Liberian activist who won the Nobel Peace Prize, is one example
of how such pressure can be used to encourage politicians to
negotiate seriously.

12 Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational
Perspective, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 91 (2013).
13 Richard Synge’s book “Mozambique” is a good example of bad
analysis and the U.S. Institute of Peace should be embarrassed by its publication.
See RICHARD SYNGE, MOZAMBIQUE: UN PEACEKEEPING IN ACTION, 1992-94
(1997).
14 David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace
Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).
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Cunningham notes the problem with a strategy of threatening
to exclude the main combatants from the negotiations is not
effective. If they are not included there are no benefits from peace,
because peace won’t be possible. The parties must always reach a
decision that their interests are better served by peace than by
continued war for any talks to begin. And there must be some
common ground that is reachable, which it is not when the aims of
those doing the fighting are diametrically opposed and nonnegotiable.
I. J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature
on the Failure of Mediation15
J. Michael Greig is the co-author of one of the most
comprehensive books on international mediation.16 Here, Greig
applies his strong analytical understanding of mediation not to one
issue, but to one case. In his assessment of Syria, he quotes one
Middle Eastern analyst as saying that President Assad will go down
fighting. If that is the case, there is little that can be done by the
international community. If active military engagement is ruled out,
the international community can do little more than encourage
opposition forces to discuss and coordinate what will happen after
the fighting stops. Efforts have been made and conferences held to
try to avoid the post-conflict chaos that has been seen in Libya. It is
unfortunate that more was not done to help Libya make the difficult
transition from dictatorship to democracy, but it is hard to anticipate
if and when regime change is going succeed and therefore hard for
the international community to know what to do and the best timing
for doing it. And if, as in the case of Syria, those in power have
strong allies like Russia and Iran encouraging them to fight on, a
mediator will have little chance of success as Kofi Annan finally
admitted. Whether his successor, Lakhdar Brahimi, will do any better
will depend on circumstances beyond his control more than his
ability to mediate.

J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on
the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).
16 J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
(2012).
15
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CONCLUSIONS - MEDIATORS AND THE REALITIES THEY FACE
Mediators almost always play a weak hand unless, like
Richard Holbrooke in the case of Bosnia, they represent an entity
that is willing to take an active part in the conflict. Whether dealt a
weak hand or a strong one, mediators play a crucial role in reaching a
peaceful resolution to a conflict and have a significant effect on the
durability of the settlement that ends the fighting. Mediators do not
simply add “grease” to the “squeaky wheel” but can redefine issues,
reshape debates, and restructure negotiations in ways that lead to
successful and peaceful outcomes. It is therefore important that
mediators carry out their responsibilities with the utmost skill and
access to the relevant research, as that will enhance the chances for
success.
At the same time, mediation often occurs in a crises situation
where it is virtually impossible to reach out and learn about past
patterns, new theories and innovative approaches. In that regard it is
useful for policymakers, to draw on the cumulative knowledge of
mediation scholars, both represented here and throughout the
research community before they get to the work of mediating. Even
if such general learning is not possible, whatever their relationship to
the situation and their power to affect it, mediators and policymakers
should consider the research-based recommendations outlined in this
collection of essays.
The journal’s goal in constructing this issue—to develop a
more robust and interactive dialogue between researchers and
practitioners—should be received as a call to the members of both
communities. It is important for researchers, who have the time to
study these matters in depth without being forced to rapidly turn
their attention to the next crisis, to share their findings on what
works and what does not with more than other academics. And those
who have served as mediators need to share with researchers their
views on the constraints they face in the field. There are a number of
ways to accomplish this kind of direct dialogue on peacemaking,
which will draw the communities together and produce mutually
beneficial results—and this issue serves as an important launch point
to begin that discussion.
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